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ATM; electronic signature (PIN); liability of the
bank
Civil case No. 3K-3-390/2002
Case category 39.2.1; 39.2.3; 39.3; 60; 94.2
The Supreme Court of Lithuania
DECISION
In the name of the Republic of Lithuania
20 February 2002
Vilnius
The panel of judges of the civil division of the Supreme
Court of Lithuania, consisting of Judges: Česlovas
Jokūbauskas (chairman of the panel), Artūras Driukas
(judge rapporteur) and Egidijus Laužikas,
Secretary Diana Jurgelevičiūtė
in the presence of the applicant Ž.Š.,1
the applicant’s advocate Mindaugas Šimkūnas,
defendant’s representatives D.B. and advocate J. E.
Alimienė,
in an open court seating examined the civil case
pursuant to the cassation complaint by the defendant –
public limited liability company ‘Lietuvos taupomasis
bankas’ regarding the review of the decision of the
panel of judges of the civil division of Vilnius Regional
Court of 13 June 2001 in a civil case between the
applicant Ž.Š. and the defendant public limited liability
company ‘Lietuvos taupomasis bankas’ regarding
compensation for damages.
The panel of judges
decided:
The applicant Ž.Š. applied to the court with the claim,
in which he stated that on 20 August 1999 he and the
defendant concluded a contract regarding the issuing
and servicing of a Maestro payment card No. xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx. On 26 August 1999 the applicant deposited
800 Litas in cash into the bank account connected to
the payment card, and on 27 August 1999 the applicant
deposited 48,200 Litas to the same account. On the
basis of the bank account reports, Ž.Š. received the
information that on 29 August 1999 almost all the
money was withdrawn from the account connected to
the payment card using various ATM machines in
Poland. However, the applicant claimed that he did not
perform these operations. The bank refused to restore
the sums of money that had been withdrawn. That way
the applicant has sustained damages. Therefore, Ž.Š.
has asked the court to recover from the defendant –
public limited liability company ‘Lietuvos taupomasis
bankas’ damages in the amount of 48,423.52 Litas
sustained due to the unlawful debit of the applicant’s
account.
By the decision of 26 March 2001, Vilnius 2nd district
court dismissed the applicant’s claim and ordered the
recovery of 12.80 Litas from the applicant for postage
expenses in favour of the state. The court dismissed the
claim because it found that there was no fault, lack of
care or diligence on the part of the defendant’s
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1 Mr. Sapalas appealed the decision of the 1st
instance court to the appeal court, thus he was an
‘appellant’ during a previous stage of the
proceedings. However, at the present cassation
stage it is the bank who appeals against the
decision of the 2nd instance (appellate proper)
court. Thus, in the strict sense, in the cassation
court the bank is the appellant. The Supreme Court
uses the original titles of the parties in its decision
– Mr. Ž.Š. is the original applicant and the bank is
the defendant.
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employees or defendant’s contracted persons in the
withdrawal of 48,423.52 Litas from the applicant’s
account.
Having considered the applicant’s appeal, by the
decision of 13 June 2001 the panel of judges of the civil
division of Vilnius Regional Court annulled the decision
of Vilnius 2nd district court of 26 March 2001 and
satisfied the applicant’s claim – awarded to Ž.Š.
48,423.52 Litas in damages and 900 Litas stamp duty
from the defendant public limited liability company
‘Lietuvos taupomasis bankas’. The appeal instance
court also awarded 2,731.77 Litas of stamp duty in
favour of the state from the defendant. The panel of
judges found that at the time of withdrawal of the
applicant’s money from the ATM of the Gdansk bank in
Bialystok city, Poland, the payment card issued by the
defendant was used by the applicant Ž.Š. in Lithuania.
These circumstances were not refuted by the defendant,
therefore the court concluded that the defendant
permitted the applicant’s account to be debited using a
payment card other than the one issued to the applicant
by the defendant. In accordance with point 4 of the
agreement of 20 August 1999 concluded between the
applicant and the defendant, the latter undertook to
debit the applicant’s account only those transactions,
which were made by the appellant using the original
payment card. The owner of the payment card is the
bank. On the basis of the explanations of the
defendant’s representatives and the testimony of
witness S.G., the court established that for the purposes
of withdrawal of cash from a bank account via an ATM
and for making payment in other places, it is mandatory
to use the payment card, i.e. it is impossible to take out
the money from the account by only knowing the PIN
code. Thus, the court concluded that the defendant
unlawfully and in violation of the agreement of 20
August 1999 has debited sums from the applicant’s
bank account connected to the payment card. Even
though the money has been withdrawn in Poland using
the PIN code, which, in the defendant’s opinion, could
have been known only to the applicant, the court
indicated, that the defendant failed to establish that the
money had been withdrawn by using the PIN code
together with the payment card issued by the
defendant’s issued payment card, or that the applicant
has affected the withdrawal of the disputed sums from
the account (Article 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
the Republic of Lithuania). The court has rejected the
defendant’s argument that there is no fault of the public
limited liability company ‘Lietuvos taupomasis bankas’
was not at fault in debiting the sums from the
applicant’s account. It was established that by
concluding the agreement, the bank undertook to
perform the operation of debiting the money, therefore,
the bank had to use the equipment and to take suitable
steps seeking to ensure that the operation of debiting
the money from the bank account could be performed
only by using the payment card issued by the bank.
In its cassation complaint the defendant public limited
liability company ‘Lietuvos taupomasis bankas’ asks to
annul the decision of the panel of judges of the civil
division of Vilnius Regional Court of 13 June 2001 and to
transfer the case to Vilnius 2nd district court for retrial.
The cassator does not agree with the decision of the
appellate court due to the following reasons:
1. The court has violated the provisions of Article 231
of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania of 7
July 1964 (CC) by transferring the burden of proof to
the defendant. Point 8 of the agreement of 20
August 1999 concluded between the applicant and
the defendant establishes that the owner of the
bank account connected to the payment card must
cover all expenses incurred by using the payment
card and the PIN code, i.e. the personal
identification code, which is used instead of the
signature in the automatic devices accepting the
card. In a court hearing, the applicant confirmed
that he received the PIN code in a sealed envelope,
which was not damaged. From the moment of
receiving the envelope, all responsibility for
ensuring the security of the PIN code was
transferred to the applicant in accordance with
Point 3 of the aforementioned agreement. The
conclusion of the court that the defendant failed to
prove that the money was withdrawn using the card
issued by the defendant’s together with the PIN
code or that the applicant has affected the
withdrawal of the disputed sum from his account,
violates effective legal norms.
2. The court, having concluded that it is impossible to
withdraw money only by using PIN code in the
accepting devices, has incorrectly assessed the
significance of the PIN code. The purpose of this
code is to preclude people other than the owner of
the bank account connected to the payment card
from withdrawing money from ATMs.
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3. The decision No. 5 of the Senate of the Supreme
Court of Lithuania of 13 June 1997 in Point 2.2
establishes that a court decision may not be based
on the assumptions about the circumstances of a
case. The cassator states that the fact that the
disputed sum was debited due to the expenses
incurred using a card other than the one issued by
the defendant may be established only within the
framework of criminal proceedings after appropriate
procedural steps are taken.
4. The conclusion of the court that the payment card is
not sufficiently protected from fraud because the
card lacks a microchip is not founded. The cards are
produced using the equipment approved in all of
the EU Member States and in accordance with strict
EU rules on quality and security of the payment
cards, such [rules] do not require using a microchip.
On the other hand, the solution of the questions at
hand requires specialist knowledge; therefore,
these questions may be answered only upon
examination by the court experts.
5. The applicant, who does not have a permanent
place of residence and legal income, deposited to
the account connected to the payment card a sum
of 49,000 Litas, and after two days, using the PIN
code known only to the applicant, in Poland, almost
exactly the same sum (48,423.52 Litas) was
withdrawn and no attempts to withdraw more
money were made. The next day the account
balance was checked, however, no questions were
raised, and only after 10 days more, i.e., after the
lapse of time period of retention of ATM video
camera recordings, the applicant contacted the
bank. These aspects of the applicant’s personality
and behaviour are totally incompatible with the
provisions of Article 1.5 of the new Civil Code
regarding the subjects of legal civil relations and
their obligation to act according to the principles of
justice, prudence and integrity in exercising their
rights and duties. The above-mentioned criteria
ought to be relied on by the appeal court.
The reply to the cassation complaint pursuant to Article
356 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of
Lithuania has not been received.
The panel of judges
concludes:
Civil liability is possible only if all of the mandatory
circumstances are present: unlawful actions, damages
(losses), causal link between the unlawful actions and
the damages (losses), and the fault of the person
responsible. Unlike the criminal or administrative law, in
civil law the actions of a person may be deemed
unlawful not only in case of violation of a prohibition
established by the law, but also in cases where a person
does not fulfil or fulfils unduly an obligation established
by an agreement, or even in cases where a person
violates the general obligation to act carefully and
diligently, which is applicable to all subjects of legal civil
relationships. Since the nature of civil liability is more
compensatory than punitive, the fault, as a precondition
of civil liability, is evaluated according to the objective
criteria – the standards of corresponding behaviour in a
specific situation. The infliction of damages (losses) by
unlawful actions is a sufficient foundation to conclude
that the fault is established, because Article 231 of CC
establishes the presumption of fault of the person
breaching an obligation. Only if the debtor proves its
innocence, could it be concluded that civil liability is not
applicable. In deciding whether the debtor’s fault is
present, the criteria of the careful and diligent person’s
behaviour in a specific situation must be applied. The
degree of care and diligence against which the debtor’s
conduct should be measured is determined firstly
evaluating whether the debtor’s actions were taken in
his professional field, since more stringent requirements
apply to professional activity. A person’s degree of care
and diligence in professional activity should be higher
than in any other activity. Therefore, the questions
whether the debtor has acted unlawfully, and whether
the damages (losses) were inflicted due to the debtor’s
fault where he acted in his professional capacity must
be determined not only against applicable specific
provisions of law or agreement, but also against likely
conduct of a careful and diligent professional in specific
professional field in a corresponding situation.
Seeking to ensure the stability of the economic
system based on private capital and private initiative,
the business activity of banks is based upon principles
of stability, credibility, efficiency and safety (Article 1(1)
of the Law on Commercial Banks of the Republic of
Lithuania). These principles form high standards of care
and diligence for the banking business activity as a
specific type of professional activity. A bank, being a
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specialized financial institution, has an obligation to act
carefully and diligently in its professional activity, and
this obligation also covers the bank’s obligation to
guarantee the credibility, efficiency and safety of its
business. Article 2(1) of the Law on Commercial Banks
of the Republic of Lithuania establishes that banks
engage in the business of accepting deposits and other
repayable funds, and provision of loans assuming all
the risks and responsibility related to these activities.
Assuming these risks and responsibility means that the
bank bears the burden of possible damages (losses)
arising out of its business activity due to its insufficient
credibility, efficiency and safety. Therefore, the bank’s
civil liability may arise not only because the bank
commits an unlawful act violating a law or an
agreement, but it may also arise because the bank
violates a general obligation to ensure sufficient
credibility, efficiency and safety of its activity in order to
eliminate the possibility of damages (losses). This
position, based upon the evaluation of standards of
credible and safe banking, has been consistently
reiterated by the Supreme Court of Lithuania while
deciding on principles of civil liability of banks (See
decision of the panel of judges of the Civil division of
the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 13 December 2000
adopted in the case UAB ‘Vileka’ v. AB bankas
‘Snoras’, case No. 3K-3-1345/2000, case category 43,
and decision of 13 June 2001 adopted in the case A.T. v.
AB bankas ‘Snoras’, case No. 3K-3-645/2001, case
category 58; 94.2; 103). 
Taking deposits and other repayable funds into the
clients’ accounts opened with the bank and
management of these accounts, the issuing of
instruments of payment (cheques, letters of credit, bills,
etc.) and carrying out transactions with them are
professional activities of banks (Article 25(1) and Article
25(4) of the Law on Commercial Banks of the Republic
of Lithuania). Issuing and carrying out transactions with
bank payment cards as an electronic payment
instruments falls within the scope of definition of the
banks’ professional activity. The bank, which issues
payment cards and carries out transactions with them,
is obliged to ensure the credible, effective and safe
functioning of its payment card system. By operating
and administrating insufficiently safe systems, which do
not ensure protection of payment cards from fraud,
systems that do not ensure protection of data required
for the formation of payment orders, and systems that
do not determine the personality of the person
performing payments, the bank assumes the risks
arising of operation of such systems.
The essence of a payment with a payment card, which
is unmediated and does not use the internet or other
distance payment methods, is that the bank performs
the payment only when the original card issued by the
bank is presented as an electronic payment instrument,
and a specific payment order – to pay the recipient a
certain amount of money – is submitted to the bank.
Additional measures ensuring credibility and security of
payments by payment cards may be used for the
purposes of confirmation of the payment order
(essential properties of the payment order) – a
requirement for the person, who forms the payment
order, to present the card holder’s identity document, a
requirement for the card holder to confirm the payment
order with his signature on a written document or with
an electronic signature – by entering a specific
sequence of data, which should normally be known only
to the card holder, into the payment terminal or an ATM
(PIN). However, these properties of payment by a
payment card do not eliminate the need to present the
payment card issued by a bank during the formation of
a payment order, because the payment card is the main
and necessary means of unmediated payment. The bank
must ensure the protection of payment cards against
fraud. The bank bears the risk that the payment will be
made with a fraudulent card or a substitute of the
original card. Therefore, in the case where the bank
carries out a payment order upon presentation of a
fraudulent card where the payment order had to be
carried out upon presentation of the original payment
card issued to the card holder, and if due to that bank’s
action the card holder sustains a loss, the burden of this
loss has to be born by the bank and not by the card
holder. The bank can completely or partially eliminate
its liability towards the card holder if it proves that it
duly fulfilled the general obligation to guarantee the
reliable protection of payment cards against
counterfeiting in accordance with the law, bank
statutes, or agreement, or if the bank proves that the
damages (losses) were wholly or partly caused by the
fault of the card holder or due to force majeure.
The fact that the payment was made in compliance
with other necessary properties of a payment order –
the instruments ensuring the reliability and security of
payment (the use of personal data or personal
identification document of a person having the right to
form a payment order, the signature on a written
document of a person having the right of signature, the
use of a proper electronic signature, etc.) may influence
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the decision whether there are circumstances that
wholly or partially eliminate the bank’s liability towards
the card holder. However, the mere fact that the
payment met the necessary properties of a payment
card does not remove the bank’s liability by itself.
First, in accordance with the law, not the client, the
bank bears the risk of damages (losses), related to the
bank’s activities of issuing payment cards into
circulation and carrying out transactions with them.
Second, the assumption of risk presupposes the
bank’s obligation to ensure the reliability, efficiency and
security of the bank’s payment cards system and an
obligation to be alert while carrying out operations with
payment cards; it forms the basis for the bank’s liability
not only for the lack of security of the payment cards
themselves, but also for the lack of reliability and
security of the bank’s payment card system, and for
establishing insufficiently reliable and secure necessary
payment properties, and for the control of use of
measures ensuring the reliability and security of the
bank’s payment card system, and for the security of the
measures implemented by the bank.
Third, the burden of proof (onus probandi) in civil
procedures is distributed, taking into consideration the
general presumption of good faith of both parties of the
civil transaction, and evaluating which party is in a
better position to prove its claims. The bank
administrates and controls the payment card system
and is responsible for the security of this system; the
bank is obliged to act prudently and carefully. In the
meantime, bank’s customers are not capable of
affecting or influencing the reliability and security of the
bank’s payment card system. In administrating and
controlling the system of settlement by payment cards,
and implementing the security measures, the bank has
a greater opportunity to prove that the security
measures of the payment card are breached and all the
necessary properties of the payment order are used due
to the customer’s fault; whereas the card holder has
lesser opportunity to prove the lack of fault on his part.
In order to prove that all of the necessary properties of a
payment card payment order were provided in order to
initiate payment, and the security measures were
neutralized with the customer’s knowledge or due to the
customer’s lack of care or diligence, the bank must
prove the specific actions of the card holder. The burden
of proof that the payment card security measures were
breached not because of the card holder’s fault, only
shifts to the card holder where it is established that the
security measures could only be neutralized with the
card holder’s knowledge or due to the card holder’s
negligence. Should the bank prove the card holder’s
fault as regards the breach of the security measures of
the payment card, and should the burden of proof of
innocence, therefore, lie with the card holder, if the
latter is unable to prove his innocence, the bank may be
wholly or partially exempted from liability, taking into
consideration the card holder’s degree of fault (Article
233 of CC).
One of the properties of the payment by a payment
card, which at the same time may be a measure
ensuring reliability and security of the payment, is the
electronic signature (PIN code). In cases where the
electronic signature (PIN code) is used during the
payment transaction, the distribution of the burden of
proof is distributed taking into consideration the level of
security of such an electronic signature. In accordance
with the provisions of Article 8(1) of the Law on
Electronic Signature of the Republic of Lithuania, an
electronic signature has the same legal force in respect
of the electronic data as a manuscript signature for
paper documents, and is admissible as evidence in
court only when the electronic signature is the secure
electronic signature created with secure signature
creation equipment and based on a valid qualified
certificate, in accordance with the requirements of
Articles 2(5), 2(11), 2(15), 3(2), 4 and the third section of
the Law on Electronic Signature. In the light of the
attributes of the concepts of the secure electronic
signature, secure electronic signature creation
equipment, and qualified certificate and its compiler, it
must be concluded that the mere fact of use of an
original electronic signature may constitute sufficient
proof of use of the electronic signature with the card
holder’s knowledge or negligence only when it is in
principle impossible to reproduce such an electronic
signature without the card holder’s knowledge or
negligence, taking into consideration the current state
of the art and the requirements regarding the creation
and use of such a signature. Therefore, in the event of a
dispute between the bank and the card holder
concerning the use of PIN code (electronic signature),
the bank must provide the probative evidence regarding
the particular actions or inaction of the card holder that
would prove the use of the PIN code (electronic
signature) with the card holder’s knowledge or due to
his negligence or lack of care. The bank also bears the
obligation to prove that the original PIN code (electronic
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signature) was used, i.e. the electronic signature, which
identifies the specific person - the bank’s client. The
sufficient basis of transfer of burden of proof to the card
holder may be established only in those cases where
the original PIN code is used, and in accordance with
the present level of equipment and in accordance with
the requirements as to the formation and usage of such
a signature, this signature could not have been
reproduced without the holder’s knowledge or
negligence.
By establishing in Points 3 and 8 of the agreement
concluded between the parties to the dispute regarding
the issuing and servicing of the bank payment card, that
transactions confirmed by the PIN code are considered
appropriately authenticated and the customer is always
responsible for the consequences of such transactions,
the PIN code is granted higher importance than the
payment card itself. These provisions establish the
presumption that every transaction confirmed by the
PIN code is lawful and these provisions establish the
presumption of the bank’s innocence regarding the
possible losses of the customer caused by such
transactions. It should be noted that the agreement is
prepared on the bank’s standard form and is concluded
by the means of adhesion of the customer (consumer)
to it. This way the transfer of risk of possible damages,
which may be incurred due to the use of the payment
card, as well as the transfer of the burden of proof in
determining the lawfulness of payment orders
successfully effected, and the transfer of the bank’s
statutory liability to the customer (consumer) by the
means of standard contractual clauses, is groundless.
The agreement regarding the issuing and servicing of
the payment card unfairly negates the presumption of
the bank’s professional liability and unlawfully limits
and abolishes bank’s civil liability for possible damages
to the customer’s (consumer’s) property, which may be
incurred in the course of the activities of the bank.
Therefore, there is no reason to follow those provisions
of the agreement regarding the issuing and servicing of
the payment card concluded by the parties, which are
contrary to the above mentioned statutory principles of
banks’ civil liability and the rules of distribution of the
burden of proof in cases where the dispute concerns the
bank’s civil liability for the damages (losses) inflicted by
the bank to its customers in the course of its
professional activity.Both courts – the first instance
court and the appellate court have reached their
conclusions in this case without fully examining all the
relevant circumstances of the case; the courts failed to
observe the above mentioned rules on the distribution
of the burden of proof in cases of such nature.
The appellate court pointed out that on 29 August
1999 in Poland the money was withdrawn using a
fraudulent payment card. However, in this case there is
no evidence that would warrant a court to make such a
conclusion. The court did not establish whether it is
possible to identify the payment card used for the
disputed transaction on the basis of data recorded by
the Polish bank whose ATM was accessed, or the private
limited liability company ‘Mokėjimo kortelių sistemos’,
the defendant or other involved persons; whether on
the basis of such data and other data present in the
case the experts could establish this circumstance;
whether it was possible to defraud the Maestro
payment card issued by the defendant to the applicant
taking into consideration the technical tools available in
1999; whether it was possible to defraud the said
payment card without the knowledge of the payment
card holder (e.g. by using the payment card in the usual
manner in an ATM or making a payment for goods or
services). Furthermore, the applicant claims that he
holds the original payment card, however he has not
presented the card to the court and does not include it
in the case documents.
The courts hearing the case established that the PIN
code, used in the course of applicant’s disputed
payments made on 29 August 1999 at an ATM of Gdansk
bank in Bialystok, was the one issued to the applicant
as to the payment card holder. The proper
determination of this circumstance, as well as the
proper evaluation of its evidentiary value could have
determined the distribution of proof and correct
solution of the case. Yet, neither the first instance court
nor the appellate court checked whether the evidence
submitted by the bank – the technical documentation –
indeed proves the claims of the bank’s representatives
that the original PIN code was used and that it was
entered correctly on the first attempt. The security level
of the PIN code has not been evaluated,
notwithstanding the fact that evaluation of this level has
material significance to the determination of the
evidentiary value of the use of the PIN code in
determining the correct distribution of the burden of
proof between the parties to the dispute.
The following material circumstances have not been
established: which data were stored in electronic form
on the applicants’ Maestro payment card; whether the
account balance was stored on the payment card;
whether the data stored on the payment card change in
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the course of the payment transactions, and in which
way precisely; whether during the withdrawal of money
from the Maestro payment card issued by the defendant
in 1999 in Poland, the corresponding amount was firstly
reserved and the actual the debit of money from the
card holder’s account was carried out at a later date;
whether these operations were carried out in real time;
whether the fact, that having checked his account
balance on 30 August 1999 with the payment card in the
defendant’s branch in Vilnius the applicant knew that a
significant amount was debited from his account, proves
that in Poland the original card issued by the defendant
was used, whether the level of technology in 1999
allowed the reproduction of the PIN code used in
Maestro payment systems without the knowledge or
negligence of the card holder; whether the data
regarding incorrectly entered PIN codes were recorded;
whether it is possible to establish that the PIN code has
been entered correctly on the first attempt; whether on
the basis of the available case materials it could be
definitely concluded that there were no attempts to
withdraw money in excess of the applicant’s account
balance in Poland; whether all possible technical data,
capable of affecting the outcome of the previous
question have been provided and whether these are
sufficient; whether the applicant has addressed the
defendant immediately after checking the account
balance and receiving the information that the balance
has decreased significantly; whether at the time of the
withdrawal transaction in Poland the ATMs used were
equipped with video cameras; whether the cameras
were operational at the time of the withdrawal, and if
they were, what the Gdansk bank’s retention period of
the video records is, which could have recorded the
persons who performed the transactions disputed by
the applicant; when the account report was prepared on
1 September 1999, who actually prepared it – the
defendant or private limited liability company
‘Mokėjimo kortelių sistemos’, when the report was sent
and when it was actually received by the applicant; why
the account report of 1 September 1999 does not
contain information about the transactions performed
on 29 August 1999 in ATMs of the Gdansk bank; what is
the usual time within which the defendant in 1999
reported to its customers the transactions performed in
Gdansk Bank ATMs in Bialystok, Poland with the
Maestro payment cards it issued.
Having established that the evidence on which the
parties base their claims and rebuttals is insufficient in
order to clarify the essential facts of the case, the courts
should have explained to the parties their right to
submit additional evidence, as well as the
consequences of failure to provide the evidence
required. (Article 15, Article 58(2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania). However, the
courts did not perform these actions and decided the
case in violation of rules on evidence and on the
distribution of the burden of proof, therefore, the case
could have been decided incorrectly. Therefore, it is
impossible to deem these decisions of both courts as
lawful and founded; they should be annulled pursuant
to the cassation procedure (Article 3542(2) of the Code
of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania).
The court that will be deciding the case anew must
establish all the material circumstances of the case,
consider the evidence presented by the parties properly,
in accordance with the rules on evidence and the
distribution of burden of proof. It must be noted that
many of the issues of the case related to the parameters
of Maestro payment cards system effective in 1999,
Maestro payment cards themselves, ATMs and
terminals, software, data transfer and storage
equipment, and other aspects of security of the system
are of technical nature and require special knowledge.
With a view of deciding these questions properly, the
question of appointment of the panel of experts must
be considered (Article 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure
of the Republic of Lithuania).
The panel of judges, in accordance with Article 368(1)
point 5 and Article 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
the Republic of Lithuania,
decides: 
To annul the decision of the panel of judges of the civil
division of Vilnius Regional Court of 13 June 2001 and
the decision of Vilnius 2nd district court of 26 March
2001 and to transfer the case for retrial to Vilnius 2nd
district court.
This decision of the Supreme Court of Lithuania is
final, not subject to appeal and effective from the date
of adoption.
Judges: Česlovas Jokūbauskas, Artūras Driukas and
Egidijus LauÏikas
Translation © Sergejs Trofimovs, 2009
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The ruling of the Supreme Court clarifies the main
issues of the evidentiary value that a PIN code and a
payment card entails, as well as the distribution of
burden of proof in case of a dispute between the issuing
bank and the customer. In the long term, this judgment
might mean that the banks will consider the application
of measures that will strengthen the security of their
payment systems.
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